Prior to the announcement of the NASA budget, a congressionally mandated group of safety experts argued that an abandonment of the Ares-1 rocket program would be unwise, due to the lack of firm imposition of NASA safety standards on any crewed space…
Prior to the announcement of the NASA budget, a congressionally mandated group of safety experts argued that an abandonment of the Ares-1 rocket program would be unwise, due to the lack of firm imposition of NASA safety standards on any crewed space vehicles that are developed by commercial companies.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s concern regarding the current move towards crewed commercial capability is centred on its belief that NASA has not imposed the Human Rating Requirements (HRR) on the currently mooted vehicles that it did on the Ares-1 launcher.
“It is the Panel’s position that no Commercial Orbital Transfer Service manufacturer is currently HRR qualified, despite some claims and beliefs to the contrary,” states the ASAP report. “Questions that must be answered are: What is the process for certifying that potential COTS vehicles are airworthy and capable of carrying astronauts into space safely? How is compliance assured over the life of the activity? The same questions would apply to any potential international orbital transportation systems.”
A summary of the discussion the ASAP had on this subject in its first quarter meeting in Washington DC last February further explains the possible problem with the current approach to the commercial designs.
It reads: “NASA is ensuring freedom of design by taking a hands-off approach. However, the COTS companies, some members of Congress, and other observers contend such vehicles could eventually become human capable. The ASAP is concerned that NASA’s hands-off stance has created a potential future capabilities mismatch because COTS firms might make innocent, good-faith design decisions that ultimately preclude future human-rated transport for NASA.”
The ASAP report strongly supported the continuation of the Ares-1 program, despite the financial and scheduling difficulties it faced.
The ASAP stressed the fact that Ares-1 has been designed with enormous emphasis on crew safety. NASA originally chose to use the Ares-1 architecture because it offers ten times the level of crew safety as that of the existing Space Shuttle.
The ASAP report states: “To abandon Ares I as a baseline vehicle for an alternative without demonstrated capability nor proven superiority (or even equivalence) is unwise and probably not cost-effective. The ability of any current COTS design to “close the gap” or even provide an equivalent degree of safety is speculative.”
It should be noted that the ASAP’s report is not antagonistic towards the prospect of commercial crewed vehicles, and does not express doubts about the capability of either SpaceX or Orbital to eventually deliver a manned spacecraft that conforms to its expected safety standards.
It confirms this through in the report’s conclusion: “Commercial entities and international partners will likely have a larger role in transporting both cargo and crew to orbit. It is crucial that NASA focus on establishing the certification requirements, a certification process for orbital transportation vehicles, and a process for validating compliance.”
The primary point of concern is that under the current arrangements with NASA, the new commercial launchers will not be built from the ground up with a sole focus on manned space flight.
The ASAP points out that traditionally, HRR criteria would be applied at the initial stages of a spacecraft’s design, which it claims has not taken place in the case of the current COTS launchers.
At the panel’s third quarter meeting in 2009, concern was expressed over the compression of the general introduction of COTS, specifically the manner in which the larger second phase of cargo contracts, worth US$3.5bn, were awarded to SpaceX and Orbital prior to either company completing its first phase of development and demonstrating proven flight capability.
The panel was particularly perturbed with the plan for the introduction of SpaceX’s Falcon 9/Dragon Capsule combination, commenting “one of the contractors will demonstrate all of its capability in a single test flight, in effect putting all of its eggs in one basket.” Falcon 9/Dragon flights to the ISS will commence after the rocket’s inaugural flight.
SpaceX CEO Elon Musk angrily refuted the panel’s judgment in a recent interview with the New York Times, in which he was quoted as saying that ASAP Chairman Admiral Joseph Dwyer “ought to be ashamed of himself.”
Musk went on to state that SpaceX has indeed designed Falcon 9 and the Dragon Capsule in accordance with published NASA safety requirements, and that the safety panel had only spent a few hours touring SpaceX’s facility before making its report.
The ASAP was established in 1968. Since the Columbia shuttle disaster in 2003 it has been tasked with producing its annual report to monitor NASA’s management and culture related to safety, and to examine the agency’s compliance with the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
